Following the move of the US embassy and the violence in Gaza, none of the Arab leaders have taken concrete actions against Israel and the American administration, for instance by recalling their ambassadors or stating the end of US mediation in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
They are all the more silent as Turkey and Iran are vocal in assuming the role of defenders of the Palestinians. The OIC meeting was the second time in six months that Erdogan has tried to rally Muslim leaders for the Palestinian cause. Despite any concrete action, it gave at least the opportunity to non-Arab leaders to set the stage and mock their neighbors for their weak reaction. That encounters a certain success in Arab opposition movements and public opinions who chide their leaders for their authoritarian policies and subordination to the United States.
Hezbollah is also trying to capitalize on the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue remains a strategic and unifying theme in the Middle East, including for Islamists, jihadists, opposition movements, or any marginalized community and minority who feel wronged by the western powers and Israel.
Though the Israel-Palestine conflict is not the driver of all conflict in the region, its invocation as a continuing grievance might nurture increasing anger with Arab leadership, including with Saudi Arabia, which is tremendously losing its credibility on that issue.
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You can find more information in our data protection declaration. But few are ready to take the next step forward and draw the curtain on an open secret. It was a trip like none other. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was on a mission this week to secure normalization between Arab states and Israel , a feat long considered impossible due to the political impasse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The deal suspended Israel's annexation of occupied Palestinian territory in the West Bank and opened the door for extensive relations between the two countries, including — one day — full diplomatic ties.
Read more : Will the Israel deal pave the way for Emirati repression? However, such collaboration is not always transparent and has the potential to spill over into larger intelligence and military cooperation.
By encouraging regional partners to normalize relations, Washington hopes to redistribute its defense burden among a more integrated defense network of regional allies. But neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia, even with support from the United Arab Emirates, can lead the kind of regional security framework that the United States has in mind.
In addition to deeply rooted intraregional mistrust and competition, most countries disagree with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel on how to deal with Iran.
Third, there is no credible proof that Saudi citizens are on board. A new Saudi narrative portrays normalization with Israel as part of a new, moderate Saudi Arabia that is taking shape. However, Saudi social actors have not demanded a relationship with Israel in the same way they have demanded other recent reforms, such as the empowerment of women or even the fight against corruption. What is more, Palestine is not just a subject of distant high politics. Palestine is also a subject of public discussions, and previously mobilization, in schools, media circles, nongovernmental organizations, public lecture halls, and mosques, including the Two Holy Mosques.
Such actions that run against the tide of popular support discredit other promising and much-needed socioeconomic and religious developments in the kingdom. Rushing any normalization with Israel politicizes the absolutely indispensable new Saudi discourse on religious tolerance.
Nor is the public blind to contradictions in the Saudi narrative itself. Similarly, not all voices that denounce Palestinian leaders and put them in the same anti-Saudi camp as Iran, Turkey, and Qatar accept the narrative that Israel is the enemy of my enemy and hence my friend. In the event of normalization, every time the Israeli army uses excessive force or political change takes place in Palestine, public sympathy in Saudi Arabia for the Palestinian cause might force the Saudi regime to react accordingly, even if only symbolically.
Fourth, normalization will not mean the two nations become friends. This narrative comes amid a state-sponsored campaign on Saudi national identity that puts Saudi identity before Arab or even Islamic identity. However, it is not clear that this identity discourse is popular across Saudi society. There has been pushback against the entirety of this hypernationalist argument—an argument that has taken over the Saudi social media landscape for the past three years.
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